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Preparing for a Consumer-Driven Genomic Age
“Liberating the NHS” — Another Attempt to Implement 
Market Forces in English Health Care
Nick Black, M.D.
Like so many recent British governments, the new Con-
servative–Liberal Democrat coali-
tion government is making struc-
tural changes to the National 
Health Service (NHS) in England. 
Such changes are being made de-
spite campaign promises by the 
Conservative Party that it would 
not reorganize the NHS and de-
spite a decade of steady improve-
ments: for example, waits for 
elective surgery have largely dis-
appeared, people with suspected 
cancers are now seen by special-
ists within 2 weeks, and survival 
rates among patients hospitalized 
in critical care units have increased 
by more than 2% per year.
Although it supports the found-
ing principles of the NHS — a 
tax-funded system that is free at 
the point of use — and has made 
a commitment to increasing fund-
ing by 1 percentage point more 
than the rate of general inflation 
over the next 5 years (a more gen-
erous increase than those for all 
other public services), the govern-
ment asserts in a white paper 
entitled “Liberating the NHS” that 
changes are needed. The govern-
ment’s acknowledgment of past 
achievements is tempered by 
claims that England has poorer-
quality care than other countries 
and that productivity is inade-
quate. Poor quality, the govern-
ment contends, has resulted from 
the previous government’s forcing 
clinicians to focus on processes 
(such as waiting times) rather 
than outcomes, from allowing 
the interests of secondary care 
providers to dominate those of 
patients and primary care practi-
tioners, and from insufficient cli-
nician engagement in manage-
ment. Productivity is seen as 
having languished because of too 
much central-government control 
and bureaucracy, insufficient use 
of market forces, and ineffective 
purchasing practices.
The government’s solution is 
founded on the conviction that 
those who know best about health 
care are not managers, health 
services researchers, or policy an-
alysts, but rather patients, pri-
mary care practitioners, and lo-
cal elected representatives. It’s 
therefore necessary, the argument 
goes, to shift the locus of control 
and influence from central gov-
ernment to as close to the patient 
as possible. Such a shift will en-
able financial responsibility to be 
linked to clinical responsibility, 
which will encourage practition-
ers to provide cost-effective care 
and ensure that the use of re-
sources reflects local needs. When 
this approach is combined with 
greater use of market forces, 
productivity will improve.
To achieve these aims, the gov-
ernment plans to change both 
players in the NHS’s internal mar-
ket, the arrangement introduced 
in 1991 to separate purchasing 
(or commissioning) of secondary 
care from its provision. (Previous-
ly, secondary care providers had 
simply received an annual budget 
from the government.) Currently, 
152 primary care trusts are re-
sponsible for purchasing second-
ary care for geographically de-
fined populations. The extent to 
which general practitioners influ-
ence their trust’s purchasing de-
cisions varies. Now, primary care 
trusts will be replaced by several 
hundred “general practice com-
missioning consortia.” Apart from 
these consortia’s covering small-
er populations than the primary 
care trusts, the main change will 
be the passing of control from 
health service managers to gen-
eral practitioners. Consortia will 
be accountable for their perfor-
mance to a new national NHS 
commissioning board, which will 
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also be responsible for commis-
sioning tertiary care.
Meanwhile, all NHS providers 
of secondary care and commu-
nity care will begin to function 
as not-for-profit public bodies, if 
they don’t already — either as 
foundation trusts (semiautono-
mous but still owned by the NHS) 
or as social enterprises (organi-
zations owned by their staff). The 
autonomy of foundation trusts 
will be extended, allowing them 
to undertake more privately fund-
ed care and giving them greater 
investment independence to de-
velop new facilities and services. 
Competition will be regulated to 
ensure that private health care 
providers are not disadvantaged 
in their bids for contracts to un-
dertake work funded by the NHS. 
These changes will be supported 
by improvements in information 
focused on outcomes.
As a result of these changes, 
the involvement of the central 
government can be reduced, with 
a 30% cut in staffing level, allow-
ing the Department of Health to 
refocus its attention on public 
health, led by a new Public Health 
Service based outside the NHS in 
local government.
Secretary of State for Health 
Andrew Lansley presented the 
proposals as “a bold and exciting 
vision” of reform, and many ob-
servers have suggested that they 
represent the most dramatic 
changes to the NHS since its es-
tablishment in 1948. Closer scru-
tiny, however, suggests otherwise. 
The proposals essentially repre-
sent a continuation of what was 
arguably the only revolutionary 
change the NHS has ever under-
gone: the introduction of the in-
ternal market by a Conservative 
government in 1991. Although the 
level of governmental support and 
enthusiasm for that policy has 
f luctuated, the past two decades 
have witnessed steady, if some-
what slow, progress toward the 
vision set out in the late 1980s. 
Whereas former Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s ambitions to make 
progress were frustrated by re-
sistance from within his own 
government, Lansley may face no 
such internal opposition.
Lansley’s claim of radical re-
form is contradicted by the ap-
parent continuity with previous 
policies: a provider market, im-
provements in information that 
focus on outcomes, financial in-
centives to improve quality, reg-
ulation rather than performance 
management, and patient-centered 
care. However, the proposals do 
contain one key change in the 
way in which the 1991 vision 
might finally be achieved by 
shifting responsibility for most 
purchasing from corporate man-
agers to primary care clinicians. 
After four decades of govern-
ments’ wresting control from the 
medical profession, this reversal 
represents a radical change.
Despite their pursuit of the 
same goals and adherence to the 
same underlying policies as pre-
ceding governments, Lansley’s 
proposals have aroused consider-
able criticism. Some negative re-
actions stem from a dislike of any 
change, some from justifiable 
worries about personal prospects. 
More widespread concern has 
arisen regarding the proposals’ 
lack of detail, particularly since 
the secretary of state has had 
several years, while out of govern-
ment, to prepare and fine-tune 
his approach. The principal con-
cern focuses on the new general 
practice commissioning consor-
tia: whereas Lansley sees general 
practitioners as “knights” who can 
stand up to the tyranny of hos-
pital specialists, others see his 
policy as simply transferring con-
trol from one type of provider 
(secondary care) to another (pri-
mary care), with little guarantee 
that patient-centered care will be 
enhanced. And several practical 
concerns will need addressing. 
For instance, most general prac-
titioners want to undertake clin-
ical work, not financial manage-
ment — and they may not be 
sufficiently informed to hold any 
hired managers to account. Of 
greater concern to the govern-
ment will be the potential varia-
tion among consortia in the ser-
vices available to patients, as well 
as the ability of general practi-
tioners to destabilize secondary 
care providers by choosing to stop 
purchasing from them. Aware-
ness of this latter risk presum-
ably explains why the government 
plans to withhold from general 
practitioners the power to pur-
chase maternity care services, re-
taining them centrally instead.
Market Forces in English Health Care
The proposals essentially represent
a continuation of what was arguably  
the only revolutionary change  
the NHS has ever undergone:
the introduction of the internal market  
by a Conservative government in 1991.
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Like all policy proposals, Lans-
ley’s plans represent only the 
start of a process that may ulti-
mately lead to the implementa-
tion of policies that look very 
different. For advocates, after the 
frustrations of two decades of 
governments that only toyed with 
implementation of an internal 
market, this initiative represents 
an opportunity to fulfill that goal. 
In the view of critics, it is the 
latest attempt to impose an in-
appropriate and flawed policy. 
Critics’ greater fear, however, is 
that the government shares that 
view and would be happy to see 
the NHS buckle under the strain, 
thereby justifying the need for 
really radical change to health 
care in England, including chang-
es to its mode of financing. In 
all likelihood, both the hopes of 
advocates and the fears of critics 
will prove to be exaggerated, and 
once again changes will be slight.
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